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ARGUMENT 
I. WILLIAMS PROPERLY SERVED HIS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MBNA; 
FURTHERMORE, BECAUSE MBNA DID NOT 
MAKE ANY OBJECTION CONCERNING THE 
ALLEGED UNTIMELY FILING OF SUCH 
MOTION WITH THE TRIAL COURT, MBNA 
WAIVED ANY RIGHT IT MAY HAVE HAD TO 
OBJECT TO THE ALLEGED UNTIMELINESS OF 
THE FILING OF SUCH MOTION. 
MBNA has argued that Williams did not properly serve his Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and therefore, MBNA had no legal obligation to 
respond to such motion. However, MBNA's argument misconstrues the 
facts of the case and is without merit. 
As has been pointed out to the Court previously, Williams served his 
Motion for Summary Judgment on MBNA by serving such motion by 
certified mail upon MBNA's attorneys on December 13, 2004 (R. 19-24, 
50). Furthermore, MBNA concedes that it received Williams' motion on 
December 15, 2004. (See, Appellee's Brief, page 5.) URCP Rule 5(b)(1) 
states the following concerning service of pleadings: 
"Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to 
be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service 
shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is 
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party 
shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the 
last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it 
with the clerk of the court." 
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Based on the facts in the record, and the admission by MBNA of 
receipt of Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment, it is clear that 
Williams complied with URCP Rule 5(b)(1) concerning service of his 
Motion for Summary Judgment by mailing a copy of such motion to 
MBNA's attorneys. 
It is also clear from the language of URCP Rule 7 that MBNA had an 
obligation to respond to such motion within ten days after the motion was 
served on MBNA. URCP 7(c)(1) states the following in relevant part: 
"Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a 
party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The gist of MBNA's argument appears to be that Williams did not 
timely file his Motion for Summary Judgment, rather than that he did not 
properly serve such motion. The record reflects that Williams did file his 
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 13, 2004, but he filed it with 
the Fifth District Court—rather than with the Third District Court, wherein 
MBNA's Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award had been filed (R. 19). The 
original of Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment was returned to him by 
the clerk of the Fifth District Court, undocketed (R. 8, 9,18,19 and 
Judgment Roll and Index). Then, after MBNA filed a motion to change 
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venue on February 14, 2005, and the case file was transferred to the Utah 
Fifth District Court on March 14, 2005, Williams re-filed the original of his 
Motion for Summary Judgment with the clerk of the Fifth District Court on 
April 26, 2005 (R. 1, 2, 19-24). 
Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed timely with the 
trial court for two reasons. First of all, Williams' motion was filed with the 
clerk of the court for the Fifth District Court on December 13, 2004—the 
same date on which it was served on MBNA by mailing. URCP Rule 5(e) is 
the Utah procedural rule that governs the filing of pleadings in civil cases, 
which states the following in relevant part: "Filing with the court defined. 
The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these 
rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court." The language 
of URCP 5(e) does not specifically require pleadings to be filed in the 
correct venue of the district court. Furthermore, Williams is not aware of 
any other Utah statutory or case law that would indicate that Williams' filing 
of the motion with the Utah Fifth District Court was not a valid filing. 
Conversely, the federal courts actually have a statute (28 U.S.C. § 
1631) that requires a court to transfer pleadings to the proper court, if filed 
with a federal court that does not have proper jurisdiction. See, Paul v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 348 F.3d 43, 44-46 (2d Cir. 2003); 
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see also, Lucaj v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 203, 205 (2d Cir. 2005). Also, at least 
one state appellate court has held that minor defects in a pleading should not 
cause a court clerk to reject the filing of the pleading. See, Rojas v. 
Cutsforth, 79 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Cal. App. 1998). Finally, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that pro se litigants should be held to less stringent 
standards than attorneys concerning pleadings. See, Haines v. Kerner, 404 
U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596 (U.S. 1972), Based on the foregoing, the 
Appellate Court should rule that Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed on December 13, 2004. 
Secondly, under the circumstances of the case, sufficient evidence 
existed for the trial court to find (in its exercise of discretion) that Williams 
"re-filed" his Motion for Summary Judgment in a timely manner. URCP 
Rule 5(d) requires a pleading to be filed "with the court either before or 
within a reasonable time after service." In addition, Utah case law dictates 
that the issue of what constitutes a reasonable time for filing a pleading is a 
matter within the discretion of the trial court. See, State Bank of Sevier v. 
American Cement & Plaster Co., 10 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1932); Culmer 
v. Caine, 61 P. 1008,1011 (Utah 1900). 
In this case, the following considerations supported a finding by the 
trial court that Williams' re-filed his motion in a timely manner: 1) Williams 
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was a pro se litigant; 2) MBNA confused Williams concerning the proper 
venue for filing his motion by placing an erroneous heading on its Petition to 
Confirm Arbitration Award; 3) the trial court further confused Williams by 
returning his original filing to him; 4) thereafter, MBNA filed a motion to 
change venue, and venue of the case was transferred to the Fifth District 
Court on March 14, 2005; 5) Williams re-filed his motion on April 26, 2005, 
six (6) weeks after venue was transferred and 29 days before he filed his 
Notice to Submit for Decision (on May 25, 2005). 
Finally, MBNA did not object to the alleged untimely filing of 
Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment at the trial court level, and 
therefore, waived any objection it might have had to such filing. See, Evans 
v. Humphrey, 5 P.2d 545, 548 (Idaho 1931). Without citing any supporting 
law, MBNA argued that it was relieved of its duty to respond to Williams' 
motion, because of the alleged untimely filing of such motion. Yet, 
Williams was not prevented by any person or any rule of law from objecting 
to the alleged untimely filing of such motion. The proper procedure would 
have been for MBNA to file a motion to strike Williams' motion, based on 
the alleged untimely filing of such motion. See, Split Rock Hardwoods, Inc. 
v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 19, 29-30 (Wis. 2002). However, 
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MBNA did not take any action whatsoever to object to such untimely filing 
in the trial court, and therefore, waived any right it had to do so. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear there is no merit to MBNA's 
arguments that Williams did not properly serve his Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and that MBNA was relieved of its duty to respond to such 
motion. 
II. BECAUSE MBNA, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
COULD NOT SATISFY THE LEGAL STANDARD 
FOR VACATING A JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS 
OF MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE, SURPRISE OR 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT BASED ON THE FACTS 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, THE APPELLATE 
COURT CAN FIND THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, EVEN THOUGH THE 
TRIAL COURT MADE NO FINDINGS 
CONCERNING ITS ORDER TO VACATE THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
MBNA has argued that the trial court had broad discretion in 
determining whether to vacate a summary judgment, and therefore, did not 
commit reversible error in vacating Williams' summary judgment. MBNA 
further argued that the trial court did not make findings concerning its ruling 
to vacate Williams' summary judgment, and therefore, the Appellate Court 
cannot determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling. 
MBNA's arguments are without merit. Even though the trial court 
had broad discretion in determining whether to set aside the summary 
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judgment, it still had to abide by the applicable standard of law in doing so. 
In this case, as has been explained in detail in Williams' Appellate Brief, in 
order to prevail on a motion to vacate a judgment based on mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, the moving party must 
demonstrate that its actions were caused by circumstances beyond the 
movant's control, rather than by the actions of the movant that could have 
been avoided by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. 
c 
(See, Brief of Appellant, pages 18-20.) Also, as has been explained in detail 
in Williams' Appellate Brief, as a matter of law, based on the facts of the 
case, MBNA could not satisfy the applicable legal standard. (See, Brief of 
Appellant, pages 20-27.) 
The only basis asserted by MBNA for setting aside the summary 
judgment was mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (R. 77-
81, 101-103). Whereas, as a matter of law, MBNA could not satisfy the 
applicable legal standard for setting aside a judgment based on mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, the only proper exercise of the 
trial court's discretion was to deny MBNA's motion to vacate Williams' 
summary judgment. Accordingly, regardless of whether the trial court made 
findings concerning its order vacating Williams' summary judgment, it is 
clear that it abused its discretion in doing so. 
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III. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE HEARING 
HELD BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED TO BE A MOTION HEARING OR A 
NON-JURY TRIAL, AT A MINIMUM, THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS REQUIRED TO ISSUE A BRIEF 
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
URCP Rule 52(a) states that a trial court "shall issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision" on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b) and 56 when the motion is "based on more than one ground." In this 
case, Williams place several legal and factual issues before the court on 
December 6, 2005, through his Motion to Strike Arbitration Award and 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 10-24, Judgment Roll and Index). 
MBNA disputed the merits of Williams' motions, but also argued that 
Williams did not timely file his Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, and 
therefore, MBNA's Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award—the equivalent 
of a URCP Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 motion—could be granted solely on that 
basis, without considering the merits of Williams' motions (Tr. pp. 10-15). 
UCA § 78-3 la-106(2) states that a motion to vacate arbitration award 
can be filed in a pending action concerning an agreement to arbitrate, or in a 
separate action—but if filed in a separate action, the motion must be served 
in the same manner as a summons. In this case, Williams served MBNA's 
agents for service—its attorneys in the above-entitled action—with his 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award by certified mail, and such attorneys 
signed a document indicating receipt (R. 50). URCP Rule 4(d)(2)(B) allows 
for service in that manner. Furthermore, a case should be deemed to have 
been commenced at the time it was filed with the clerk of the trial court, 
even if no filing fee was paid at that time. Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225, 
1229 (Utah 2001). Payment of a filing fee was never an issue in this case, 
because no filing fee was ever assessed to Williams concerning his motion. 
Other than the proof of service of MBNA's Petition to Confirm 
Arbitration Award—served on December 7, 2004—there was no evidence in 
the court record of when Williams first received the Arbitration Award (R. 
4-6, 9). If Williams first received the Award on December 7, 2004, and filed 
his motion to vacate the award on December 13, 2004, his motion was 
timely filed—within 90 days of receipt of the Arbitration Award. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear the court could have based its 
decision either on a ruling that Williams' Motion to Vacate Arbitration 
Award was not timely filed or on a ruling that such motion had no merit. 
Accordingly, at a minimum, the Appellate Court should remand the case to 
the trial court to make a written ruling concerning its decision, regardless of 
whether the hearing held on December 6,2005, should be construed to be a 
motion hearing or a non-jury trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court should reverse the trial 
court's Order Vacating Judgment Award entered on September 6, 2005. In 
addition, the Appellate Court should either vacate or remand the trial court's 
Order Confirming Arbitration Award entered on December 16,2005, 
because the trial court failed to make any formal ruling or findings of any 
kind whatsoever in support of such Order. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 2006. 
JOHN C. HEATH, PLLC 
By: 
Paul H. Johnson, Esq. 
A ttorney foilAppellant/Defendant 
LaunaleM. Williams 
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